Ethics and Experts by O\u27Reilly, Terry
Journal of Air Law and Commerce




Follow this and additional works at: https://scholar.smu.edu/jalc
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at SMU Scholar. It has been accepted for inclusion in Journal of Air Law and
Commerce by an authorized administrator of SMU Scholar. For more information, please visit http://digitalrepository.smu.edu.
Recommended Citation




No lesson seems to be so deeply inculcated by the experi-
ence of life as that you never should trust experts. If you
believe the doctors, nothing is wholesome: If you believe
the theologians, nothing is innocent: If you believe the
soldiers, nothing is safe. They all require to have their
strong wine diluted by a very large admixture of insipid
common sense.'
EXPERT WITNESSES are an ethical problem. They
are inevitable, irreplaceable, chillingly expensive and,
perhaps worse, they have assumed a commanding posi-
tion in tort aviation litigation. In more complex matters,
the lawyers are sometimes reduced to the position of a
General Staff officer, simply managing brigades of expert
testimony. It is the expert whose persuasive abilities di-
rect the course of the trial, not the arguments of counsel.
We know that juries distrust lawyers and look to the wit-
nesses for convincing evidence. In this context, it is the
advocate/expert who commands the field, regardless of
the skill of the questioner.
What, then, are the ethical rules regarding the use of
this powerful figure, the academically endowed superwit-
ness who, by law, can depart from the facts and offer opin-
ion as if it were truth?
* Mr. O'Reilly is a partner at O'Reilly & Collins in Menlo Park, California. He
holds a B.A. from Loyola University and aJ.D. from the University of California,
Berkeley.
I Letter from Robert, Marquis of Salisbury, to Lord Lytton (June 15, 1877).
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This paper discusses some thoughts on this little-ex-
plored topic, with a few suggestions for further thought.
THE VIEW FROM THE WITNESS CHAIR
It is pointless to rely upon the professional ethics of ex-
perts, even where such a code exists, because most such
codes have no binding effect and are often politely disre-
garded.2 Apart from the broad requirement that a witness
not give false testimony,3 there is no binding legal state-
ment of ethics for witnesses. Unless the expert is bound
by a personal code of ethics or the rare professional code,
specific to his own discipline, the lawyer cannot reason-
ably expect a witness to police himself.4
In all fairness to the expert, there is an unresolved di-
lemma that faces every expert and no agreed solution is to
be found at law.
At the root of many of the ethical dilemmas experienced
by scientists who become professionally involved in the
law's adversarial system is the clash of two cultures. Law is
an adversary process with a different set of operating pro-
cedures and values than science. For example, attorneys
are free to interpret scientific evidence in a way that sup-
ports their client. Indeed, it is their ethical obligation to
do so. Scientists, however, would not tolerate the arbi-
trary presentation of data or the deliberate concealment of
unfavorable experimental outcomes. In science, the truth,
wherever it may lead, serves everyone's interest. In the
legal system, that which serves the interest of one's client
is what counts as the truth.5
2 Reference to the Hippocratic Oath is generally regarded by physician experts
as quaint, at best, and as a meaningless historical allusion, at worst.
, " Before testifying, every witness shall be required to declare that the witness
will testify truthfully, by oath or affirmation administered in a form calculated to
awaken the witness' conscience and impress the witness' mind with the duty to do
so." FED. R. EvID. 603.
4 Few professions have given the subject much thought. Forensic scientists
have explored the field, as have psychologists, but beyond this the various profes-
sions seem to rely upon the law to police this problem.
5 Mark S. Frankel, Ethics and the Forensic Sciences: Professional Autonomy in the Crimi-
nal Justice System, 34J. FORENSIC Sci. 763 (1989).
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Is the expert a scientifically detached observer of the
fact whose opinion seeks objective impartiality, regardless
of whose ox is gored? Or, is the expert an advocate for
those facts and interpretations which best serve the inter-
ests of his client?
One discipline that has given some serious considera-
tion of this ethical dilemma is the science of psychology.
6
Some trial lawyers may see an irony in this. There are few
experts harder to cross-examine than the behaviorists,
whether they be psychologists, human factors experts, or
their medical counterparts, the psychiatrists. None of
these fields seem to have firm standards and judicial at-
tempts to limit their testimony have largely failed. 7 Psy-
chologists are not insensitive to this problem.
The experimental psychologist who testifies as an expert
witness is virtually always hired by the attorneys for one
side in a case. Because attorneys' ethics require them to
be zealous advocates for their clients, they often want the
psychologist to discuss in expert testimony only those
points for which the available psychological research sup-
ports their client's position. Psychologists who offer dif-
ferent testimony depending on who has hired them act at
least to some extent as advocates; psychologists whose tes-
timony does not differ according to employer act as impar-
tial educators of the jury.
*i **
Current practice in this sort of expert testimony is prob-
ably closer to advocacy than to impartial education ....
Most conference participants agreed that the most de-
sirable role for the expert is that of impartial educator,
6 10 LAW AND HUMAN BEHAVIOR,June, 1986 is given to multiple articles on this
subject and is as good an overview as is presently available.
7 In theory, psychiatrists cannot testify concerning non-patients. See Matter of
Cheryl H., 153 Cal. App. 3d 1098 (Cal. Ct. App. 1984); In re Thomas, 183 Cal.
App. 3d 786 (Cal. Ct. App. 1986). However, we often hear opinions on the con-
duct and mental processes of deceased pilots. To complicate the question, of
course, is the accepted right to pose these opinions behind a well-phrased hypo-
thetical. Am-Cal Investment Co. v. Sharlyn Estates, 255 Cal. App. 2d 526 (Cal.
Ct. App. 1967).
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and some held that this is the only ethically defensible po-
sition ....
Many conference participants disagreed, however, con-
tending that the educator role is difficult if not impossible
to maintain, both because of pressures toward advocacy
from the attorneys who hire the expert, and because of a
strong tendency to identify with the side for which one is
working within an adversary system, and seek to be a re-
sponsible advocate, presenting one side of an issue with-
out distorting or misrepresenting the available
psychologist research.'
It is important to focus on this dilemma. In general, I
believe lawyers expect experts to maintain some degree of
objectivity, assuming that an expert will not "lie",
although we may accept some degree of advocacy as una-
voidable. At the heart of the matter, I think we generally
accept that an expert, when confronted with hard contra-
dictory evidence, will bow to the better argument. This
happens often enough to reinforce what may in fact be
naive faith.
In truth, there are experts who sincerely believe that it
is their job to be advocates and to make no attempt to be
fair. Frightening though such a proposal would be, Dr.
Loftus' conclusion is even more shocking.
The view that psychologists may serve as advocates,
presenting only the beneficial side of the case, begins with
the argument that the trial is an adversary process in
which each side has the right to make the best possible
case ....
Rivlin9 went so far as to suggest that we acknowledge
the development of a 'forensic social science' rather than
pretend to be balanced, objective, free of personal biases,
and acting as if we are offering all sides of the case so that
people can judge for themselves. If left to Rivlin's design,
a psychologist would simply prepare a position paper for
or against a particular proposition. The position would be
Michael McLoskey, et al., The Experimental Psychologist in Court, 10 LAW AND BE-
HAVIOR 1, 4-5 (1986).
11 Alice M. Rivlin, Forensic Social Science, 43 HARV. EDUC. REV. 61 (1973).
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clearly stated, and the evidence that supports one side of
the argument would be brought together. Thejob of criti-
quing the case that has been presented and of detailing
the counter evidence would be left to a scholar working
for the opposition. . .. 'o
Can some tentative conclusions be drawn on the advo-
cate/educator issue, or should the decision be left to the
individual psychologist? My inclination is to take a Dar-
winian approach. Each individual can decide what strat-
egy best suits him or her, and let the survival of the fittest
expert prevail."
Quickly overlooked is the reality of a Darwinian solu-
tion. The wasted species are not three toed sloths or tree
frogs; the failed experiments are the clients whose lawyers
picked the less persuasive psychologist/advocate. From
Dr. Loftus' perch, the victim is the unsuccessful advocate
expert, whose fees deteriorate due to his poor persuasive
abilities, not the client, for whom the inept expert may
mean poverty and incarceration.
While lawyers may bridle at Dr. Loftus' brutal thesis, we
should stop and ask the obvious question. How many ex-
perts already believe in this as their personal code? To
what extent is this Darwinian struggle already played out
in our courts?
Before criticizing the expert, it must be said that law-
yers cannot seem to agree on this point. We, too, face a
Darwinian system. Good lawyers "win" cases by ob-
taining the best result for their clients. Less successful
lawyers fade from the arena. We accept this as the harsh
code of trial work. Inevitably this requires the search for
the most persuasive experts and their early retention, re-
gardless of the costs. If this is now a lumbering Franken-
stein, the truth is that you and I tightened all the screws
and turned on the electricity.
A single persuasive expert can turn years of preparation
10 Elizabeth F. Loftus, Experimental Psychologist as Advocate or Impartial Educator, 10
LAw & HUMAN BEHAVIOR 63, 71 (1986).
,, Id. at 77.
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upside down and convince a jury to reach a conclusion
which befuddles and mocks the probabilities of the evi-
dence. While I believe that juries will generally find the
truth, 2 there are a small number of cases which defy the
evidence and produce results that are unpredictable and
sometimes alarming. On reflection, these peculiar results
can often be linked to the testimony of an expert witness
which was not anticipated and was devastating in its effect
on the finder of fact.' 3
Although experts have been an integral part of litiga-
tion since blunt weapons were last used to settle disputes,
the truly professional witness, beyond criminal circles, is
something of a post-war phenomenon.' 4
It is perhaps not surprising in aviation cases that Con-
gress decided to exclude National Transportation Safety
Board Investigators from the Courts, as far as possible.
While this effort has not always been successful, the Fed-
eral Aviation Regulations (FARs) have at least given law-
yers in the field of aviation litigation some relief from the
forbidding presence of the official government investiga-
tor.' -5 This is just as well, as it is a truism that few lawyers
would dispute that in civil cases juries trust the cop more
than any other expert.
Since the official government investigator is not avail-
able, we have been forced to employ a bewildering pano-
12 As those who have seen mock jury deliberations know well, this is a truly
frightening process. To amend Bismark's famous analogy, this process, like sau-
sage making and legislation, is best not seen until finished.
13 Experience confirms that juries are not alone in their ability to be guiled.
14 An industry which advertises heavily by mail and trade publication and which
is often centralized with multiple experts, available nationwide, by phone call.
15 The Supreme Court has trod an uncertain path in dealing with this issue. In
Beech Aircraft Corp. v. Rainey, 488 U.S. 153 (1988), the Court permitted admis-
sion of the probable cause finding of a JAG accident report, under the Public
record exception of Rule 803(8)(c). This is an odd counterpart to U.S. v. Varig
Airlines, 467 U.S. 797 (1984), where the Court relieved the FAA from responsibil-
ity for negligent certification on the grounds that the FAA had neither the staff
nor the ability to perform its duties in a reliable manner. Why the Judge Advocate
Corps should be ordained with this Judicial imprimatur while the FAA is pro-
tected in the dunce's corner is a contradiction that seems invisible only in
Washington.
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ply of experts. For instance, we have the "accident
reconstruction expert", a civil variation of the cop, hope-
fully one with Lindberg skills and humility, entrusted with
guiding the jury through the remote wild blue yonder that
few of them have ever visited (without a movie and a cock-
tail). Then, depending upon the case, come the engi-
neers, the metallurgists, the designers, and then the
subspecialists, whether the subject be fatigue, weather, pi-
lot error or the like.
Lastly, and most mystifyingly, come the behaviorists,
who can mediate upon the human condition as a whole
and decide what was in the mind of others, in the serene
knowledge that the suspect is generally dead and incapa-
ble of rebuttal. Taken as a whole, this pneumatic body of
testimony, sometimes moved whole from case to case, can
create a tide of opinion which overwhelms an opponent,
and sometimes, the truth.
But, is this ethical?
The truly qualified expert who has become an advocate
is uncontrollable, particularly if he or she is a disciple of
Dr. Loftus. Although good preparation can snare an ex-
pert with prior inconsistent testimony, the truth is that
these moments are rare. The really skilled expert is sel-
dom trapped by past overstatement. The capable expert
does not step blindly into falsity. All he has to do is cham-
pion a minority opinion, sliding glibly through cross-
examination with semantic shields. The words "not nec-
essarily" should probably be inscribed on every expert's
tombstone.
Although I practice entirely for the plaintiff, I believe
that the statements made so far would apply equally to
both plaintiff and defendant. Where the defendant sees
outrageous fantasy, the plaintiff sees blind obstinacy. In
either case, it makes little difference, since the end result
is a cultivated, educated and well groomed witness who
has become our worst nightmare, an advocate who has the
opportunity to testify.
1993] 119
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THE VIEW FROM THE BENCH
Typically, federal and state statutes require little of an
expert other than that his testimony "assist" the trier of
fact.
This liberal view of expert testimony reflects Wigmore's
early thoughts on the subject.
The true test of the admissibility of such testimony is not
whether the subject matter is common or uncommon, or
whether many persons or few have some knowledge of the
matter; but it is whether the witnesses offered as experts
have any peculiar knowledge or experience, not common
to the world, which renders their opinions founded on
such knowledge or experience any aid to the court or the
jury in determining the questions at issue.' 6
This view has been fully adopted by Federal Rule 702.
If scientific technical, or other specialized knowledge will
assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to de-
termine a fact in issue, a witness qualified as an expert by
knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education, may
testify thereto in the form of an opinion or otherwise.
These statutes do not even require that the technical
testimony be on matters unrelated to the knowledge of
thejury. Even though the subject may be one of common
knowledge, the test is whether or not the expert would
provide testimony which potentially could assist the trier
of fact, regardless of the common knowledge of the
jurors. 17
Where once the courts required some degree of unu-
sual knowledge (the "beyond the ken" test as it is some-
times called),' 8 most State courts have backed away from
this requirement. 19
Although few trial lawyers would object to a liberal ex-
61 7 JOHN WIGMORE, WIGMORE ON EVIDENCE, § 1923 (Chadbourn, Rev. 1978).
'1 United States v. Downing, 753 F.2d 1224, 1229 (3d Cir. 1985); United States
v. Windfelder, 790 F.2d 576, 582 (7th Cir. 1986).
" Kulak v. Nationwide Mut. Life Ins. Co., 351 N.E.2d 735, 737 (N.Y. 1976).
is, Selkowitz v. County of Nassau, 379 N.E.2d 1140 (N.Y. 1978). Not all states,
however. California still requires that the subject matter be "beyond common
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pert rule 2 0 this has led to expert testimony on issues
which would seem so clearly within common knowledge
that the use of an expert is gilding the lily. Does a jury,
for instance, really need a photographic expert to decide
if the robber in a bank photograph is the same person
cowering behind the defense table?2 l
Nor is this problem confined to the criminal field,
where perhaps the courts can be justified in leaning over
backwards to prevent a false conviction. Civil experts also
talk at great length about the obvious. For instance, does
a jury really need to hear from an expert that it is unwise
to dive headfirst into shallow water?22
The vice of this liberality is that it leaves the trial lawyer
vulnerable to the very real fear that he must have an ex-
pert on any given subject, no matter how obvious, or run
the risk that his opponent will call such an expert and the
case will be lost. There is some comfort to be found in
the appellate cases, since exclusion of experts does occur
and is sometimes supported, but these cases are very
much in the minority.2
If experts can, then, testify on almost every subject, no
experience." CAL. EVID. CODE § 801 (West 1966); Rosburg v. Minnesota Mining
& Mfg. Co. 181 Cal. App. 3d 726, 732 (1986).
20 All swords, after all, have two edges.
21 United States v. Barrett, 703 F.2d 1076 (9th Cir. 1983) (the trial court
thought not, the appellate court reversed); see also United States v. Roark, 753
F.2d 991 (1 th Cir. 1985) (in which a psychologist was called to offer an opinion
concerning whether the defendant meant what she said when she admitted her
guilt. The appellate court thought the testimony appropriate, falling back upon
that hoary rubric that it all went to the weight of the testimony.).
22 Leonard v. Pitstick Dairy Lake & Park, 464 N.E.2d 644 (I11. App. 1984) (yes
they do, according to the appellate court).
21 Andrews v. Metro N. Commuter R. Co., 882 F.2d 705 (2d Cir. 1989) (holding
that an expert was not necessary to testify that a filthy platform would be unsafe);
Rossman v. K-Mart Corp., 701 F. Supp. 1127 (M.D. PA 1988) (finding no need for
an expert to discuss the liability of a store to a customer who was crushed in a riot
over Cabbage Patch dolls). Lastly, and one of my favorites, is United States v.
Barta, 888 F.2d 1220 (8th Cir. 1989) (rejecting the testimony of a defense psy-
chologist in a tax fraud case. The psychologist offered the thought that the de-
fendant was suffering from a personality disorder which was described as "detail
phobia," thus being unable to be responsible for the fraudulent details of the tax
return). I often find myself afflicted with detail phobia, although I receive no
more sympathy than the unfortunate Barta.
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matter how obvious, is there any restraint on the expert
who views his subject not from the accepted center, but
from the nut fringe? Again, the bench offers little hope
on this subject.
For many years the leading case on this subject was Frye
v. United States.24 Frye established the "general accept-
ance" standard, deciding that the test for expert testi-
mony was whether the process, system, or theory upon
which the evidence was based was "sufficiently established
to have gained general acceptance in the particular field in
which it belongs. 2 5 Frye is a criminal case, which is still
cited to exclude fringe testimony.26
In June 1993, the Supreme Court resolved this ques-
tion, to some extent, in Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuti-
cals, Inc.27 This case deals with the drug Bendectin, a
frequent source of appellate rulings on Frye issues.28 The
parties had gathered droves of epidemiologists to review
and to reassess the published data, with the inevitable re-
sult that their findings were totally opposed. The trial
court cut this Gordian knot by rejecting the plaintiff's ex-
perts, since their analysis had not met peer review and was
therefore not "generally accepted," specifically using the
Frye test. The Supreme Court found that the Federal
Rules had superseded Frye, at least to the extent that Frye
constituted a threshhold test.
That the Frye test was displaced by the Rules of Evidence
does not mean, however, that the Rules themselves place
no limits on the admissibility of purportedly scientific evi-
dence. Nor is the trial judge disabled from screening such
evidence. To the contrary, under the Rules the trial judge
must ensure that any and all scientific testimony or evi-
24 Frye v. United States, 293 F.2d 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923).
25 Id. at 1014.
N, Frye has been repeatedly cited to exclude hypnotically refreshed testimony.
State v. Hughes, 453 N.E.2d 484 (N.Y. 1983); Illinois v. Zayas, 546 N.E.2d 513
(Ill. 1989).
27 113 S. Ct. 2786 (1993).
28 Novak v. United States, 865 F.2d 718 (6th Cir. 1989); Sterling v. Velsicol
Chem. Corp., 855 F.2d 1188 (6th Cir. 1988); Brock v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuti-
cals, Inc., 855 F.2d 167 (5th Cir. 1989).
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dence admitted is not only relevant, but reliable.2 9
Fair enough, but what makes scientific testimony "relia-
ble"? The Court turned to the "scientific knowledge"
language of Rule 702, albeit in a somewhat circular
fashion.
[I]n order to qualify as 'scientific knowledge,' an inference
or assertion must be derived by the scientific method.
Proposed testimony must be supported by appropriate
validation-i.e. 'good grounds,' based on what is known.
In short, the requirement that an expert's testimony per-
tain to 'scientific knowledge' establishes a standard of evi-
dentiary reliability."13 0
In a sense, determining scientific reliability is like trying
to pin down a definition of obscenity. Fine concepts drift
into a semantic bog from which emerges, at best, a local
standard, dependent on each judge's education and toler-
ance for novelty.
In an effort to break the semantic circle, the Supreme
Court does offer some tests; first, whether the scientific
knowledge will assist the trier of fact, second, whether the
theory has ever been subject to peer review, and, lastly,
whether there is a "known or potential rate of error."'3
Some very precise fields of science (the Court suggests
spectrography) may be subject to this analysis, but it is
hard to see how this can be applied to the less exact
sciences.
Perhaps most significantly, while the Court finds that
Rule 702 is the guiding principle, the Court does not
abandon the Frye test.
Finally, 'general acceptance' can yet have a bearing on the
inquiry. A 'reliability assessment does not require,
although it does permit, explicit identification of a rele-
vant scientific community and an express determination of
a particular degree of acceptance within that community.
United States v. Downing, 753 F.2d at 1238 (citations omit-
29 Daubert, 173 S. Ct. at 2794-95.
3o Id. at 2795.
31 Id. at 2797.
1993]
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ted). Widespread acceptance can be an important factor
in ruling particular evidence admissible, and 'a known
technique that has been able to attract only minimal sup-
port within the community,' Downing supra, at 1238, may
properly be viewed with skepticism.3 2
In short, the Court finally came down on both sides,
simply reducing "general acceptance" from its former sta-
tus as a bar to a mere test (although the effect of its appli-
cation would be the same). Still unresolved is the
problem every Court faces-the well-qualified expert
whose opinion challenges accepted wisdom, or worse,
who uses the same data as the opposing experts to reach
opposite conclusions. Daubert suggests that in the end,
discretion is the better part of valor and restrictions on
novel testimony will be few.
It is easy to sympathize with the courts confronted with
novel scientific testimony. Firm standards learned in col-
lege and law school can often become quaint historical
anomalies by the time an experienced lawyer ascends to
the bench. Where once damages were limited to pecuni-
ary loss in wrongful death cases, now it is not unusual for
the plaintiff's economist to discuss "hedonic damages"
and to have the courts endorse this expanding area of
recovery. 3
Similarly, the history of science is strewn with firm prin-
ciples, once resolutely defended by gray-bearded profes-
sors, which modern experts dismiss with amused
shudders .4
My next witness, your honor, will be Piltdown Man. 5
32 Id.
13 See Sherrod v. Berry, 629 F. Supp. 159 (N.D. Ill. 1985) (supporting an
$850,000 hedonic damages award). But see Mercado v. Ahmed, 756 F. Supp. 1097
(N.D. 11. 1991), aff'd, 974 F.2d 863 (7th Cir. 1992). See also PALFIN & DANNIGER,
HEDONIC DAMAGES (1990).
34 GORDON, GREAT MEDICAL DISASTERS (1983).
- Pitdown Man was a prehistoric skull fragment "discovered" in the English
countryside in the 19th Century. Some of the greatest scientific minds of the time
considered Piltdown Man to be the long sought "missing link" between ape and
man, until it was proved to be a forgery many years later. See FRANK SPENCER,
PILTDOWN: A SCIENTIFIC FORGERY (1990).
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One of the grayest ethical areas must be the casual man-
ner in which inadmissible and hearsay evidence is pumped
into the basis for an expert's opinion. There is perhaps
no greater opportunity for mischief, and again the courts
have done little to patrol this enormous loophole in Rule
703. Thus, a defendant's doctor in a personal injury case
has been allowed to testify on the possibilities of curing a
plaintiff's knee injury, based upon newspaper accounts of
surgery on Mickey Mantle,3 6 or a plaintiff's expert was
given the opportunity to offer opinions based upon "liter-
ature and information furnished him by plaintiff's attor-
ney," and upon "a whole body of literature in the area of
"137bio-mechanics.
Some cases require the courts to examine the reliability
of the underlying sources,3 8 but there are few guidelines
and attempts to impose guidelines generally assume a
knowledge of the expert's discipline that courts rarely
possess.3 9
If the trial court chooses to rigorously view the support-
ing evidence upon which an expert relies, there is some
hope of keeping the testimony at least loosely related to
the evidence the jury hears. This can be a mixed blessing,
however, if the judge acts arbitrarily based on a poor un-
derstanding of the expert's discipline, or, perhaps worse,
if the judge has a mild degree of experience in the field
himself. The latter is especially problematic, since errors
and misunderstandings in the judge's recollection are dif-
ficult to correct and sometimes lead to exclusion of en-
36 Gregory v. South Hills Movers Inc., 477 F. Supp. 484, 488 (W.D. Pa. 1979).
17 Mannino v. International Mfg. Co., 650 F.2d 846, 853 (6th Cir. 1981).
"m Soden v. Freightliner Corp., 714 F.2d 498, 505 (5th Cir. 1983).
.9 See In rejapanese Elec. Prod. Antitrust Litig., 723 F.2d 238, 276-78, (3rd Cir.
1983), rev'd, Matsushita Elec. Indust. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574
(1986), which seems to assume that the trial court judge can rely upon the assess-
ment of other experts to determine what reliable material would be in a given
discipline. In contrast, Judge Weinstein took a very rigorous attitude toward the
experts' opinions in his opinion In re Agent Orange Prod. Liab. Litig., 611 F.
Supp. 1223 (E.D.N.Y. 1985), aff'd, 818 F.2d 187 (2d. Cir. 1987), cert. denied, Lom-
bardi v. Dow Chem. Co. 487 U.S. 1234 (1988), discussing at some length his
means for reviewing the bases for the experts' opinions. See also Shatkin v. Mc-
Donnell Douglas Corp., 727 F.2d 202 (2d Cir. 1984).
1993] 125
126 JOURNAL OF AIR LA WAND COMMERCE
tirely appropriate expert testimony. Generally, however,
I believe the judge who closely reviews an expert's under-
lying foundation is more of a help than a hindrance.
Far more difficult to control is the expert who has omit-
ted relevant material in order to reach his opinion. This is
an area of great ethical concern for the lawyer, since it is
within the lawyer's power to restrict the source material
given to the expert, and deft manipulation of the available
evidence can lead an honest expert to offer an opinion, in
all good faith, which would be entirely different if all the
facts were available. The theory that this evil is uncovered
by cross-examination is often naive.
Unfortunately, it is not clear from the applicable codes
of ethics that such conduct is unethical on the part of the
attorney; it can easily be viewed as simply zealous repre-
sentation of a client and an extension of normal
advocacy.40
In short, with the rare exception of an assertive and so-
phisticated judge, there is little prospect that an expert's
tactics or research will be closely scrutinized. It is impos-
sible for the average jurist, or even the exceptional jurist,
to be fully briefed on the technical issues raised by every
case, or the subtleties of the disciplines of the experts.
There are few Solomons, and it should be remembered
that Solomon himself was not entirely successful as a
judge. Nor was his wisdom unending.
The ethical problem, then, reverts again to the lawyer.
The Federal Rules of Evidence have given us more or less
an open field when it comes to presenting expert testi-
40 There is little to be said for the expert who deliberately ignores facts to man-
ufacture an opinion. I recently examined an expert on visibility issues, who con-
ducted extensive reconstruction of the accident while carefully refusing to
determine whether the defendant, whose eyesight was in question, had normal
vision. In fact, the defendant was legally blind in both eyes, evidence which most
experts would consider of some importance. The expert had talked to the de-
fendant at some length, but was apparently unmoved by the defendant's
"cokebottle" glasses. Not surprisingly, the case settled, but not before the expert
had testified at considerable length to the faultlessness of the defendant.
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mony. How much advantage can we ethically take of the
opportunity given by the law?
III. THE VIEW FROM THE COUNSEL TABLE
It is the duty of an attorney to do all of the following:
(d) To employ, for the purpose of maintaining the
causes confided to him or her such means only as are con-
sistent with truth, and never to seek to mislead the Judge
or any Judicial Officer by an artifice or false statement of
fact or law.4'
However hard the rule may be to enforce, virtually all
States' Statutes agree; it is the responsibility of the lawyer
to present truth and, by implication, not to present distor-
tion of the truth by an expert. The expert may see a di-
lemma, but there is only one horn that the attorney can
accept. It is our responsibility to make sure that the ex-
pert understands his place and agrees to accept it.
If the experts look for a Darwinian solution, then we are
in the position to provide one. Since we pay the expert,
we can reject the advocate and seek the objective expert.
This may not be the easiest solution and it may call for a
far greater exercise of skill on the part of the trial lawyer,
but neither effort is undesirable.
Rather than retreat behind these generalities, however,
I believe the time has come to set some rules. Some of
the rules I would suggest are really a matter of self-inter-
est. For instance, I would first suggest that we only seek
experts with legitimate qualifications. We all know that there
are experts with endless self-esteem, perfectly prepared to
reconstruct accidents, to examine metal fatigue, or to in-
terpret the F.A.R.s, qualifications be damned. We also
know that there are some fringe areas where an expert can
4, CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 6068(d) (West 1990). Section 6068(f) reads, in
part, that it is the duty of the attorney "[tlo abstain from all offensive personal-
ity .. " Id. § 6068(f). Makes you wonder if anybody ever reads this. It also
makes you wonder who wrote this.
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easily self-promote his qualifications without a clear lit-
mus test. Biomechanics is only the most glaring of these
areas. There are, however, legitimate experts in these
fields and it would seem an ethical duty to seat those ex-
perts and to trim the self-promoters.
Similarly, I believe it to be an ethical duty of the lawyer
to achieve an independent assessment of the subject matter. With
a busy practice, it is easy to retain an expert and then to
let the expert dictate the direction of the lawsuit. Once
this is done, any attempt to exercise critical judgment of
the ethical conduct of the expert is lost. If one only ac-
cepts what one is told, how can one judge? Good trial
lawyers try to learn as much as they can about the central
issues of their case. In this business, good ethics and
good practice are one.
The ethical lawyer should always fully inform the expert of
all the facts. Again, this seems to be obvious, since the ill-
informed expert is also subject to damaging cross-exami-
nation, but in the real world not every lawyer is well pre-
pared and an expert working with cultivated ignorance
can often pass unscathed.
An ethical attorney should pose the question, not the answer.
An expert who would accept an opinion simply because
an attorney wants it to be so, is not an expert one should
employ. This is the obvious extreme, however, and as is
often the case with ethical questions, the difficult area is
the area in the middle, where the lawyer becomes a spin-
doctor for his own case. This is a particularly easy trap for
the harassed lawyer in trial, whose case is not doing well.
Leading questions can be just as effective in priming an
expert before trial as they can be with a jury. The danger
is that if those leading questions are asked in conference
before trial, they can so firmly suggest a needed opinion
that objectivity disappears. The ethical lawyer should bite
his tongue and work with the opinion he is given, not
mold that opinion to the needs of the moment.
Since lawyers have firm ethical guidelines and experts
do not, it should be the duty of the lawyer to give ethical
ETHICS AND EXPERTS
guidance. We have to be committed to the truth. There
are many disciplines in which the truth is barely recogniz-
able and may in fact be unavoidably relative. That is when
a firm commitment to objectivity is needed most. The co-
rollary of that rule is that a lawyer should not interfere with
discovery. Unless the deposition examination infringes on
truly privileged areas, I believe it is unethical for a lawyer
to steer his witness through cross-examination by disrup-
tive objections. I recognize that in the real world, this is a
particularly difficult line to draw. Trial lawyers are, by na-
ture, adversarial and there are times when all patience
wears out. Still, if the expert cannot float on his own, the
lawyer should not start paddling.
Lastly, I strongly believe that experts should not be allowed
to substantially alter their opinion after their deposition.
Although this would seem to be a simple area of equity, to
be managed by the trial court judge, in practice this is an
area of great mischief and deceit. To some extent, the
plaintiffs are more vulnerable, since a defendant has the
opportunity to review the entirety of the plaintiff's case
and then to rush out to perform theory or to support an
alternate explanation of the accident. In theory, a plaintiff
can perform the same disservice to the truth by using re-
buttal, although this is so much of a matter for discretion
that it is a very risky solution.
The Federal Rules require that by the time the parties
reach a pretrial conference, the evidence be set and the
parties be prepared to try the issues with an exposed
hand. I strongly believe that this is the only appropriate
way to limit a herd of experts revising their opinions after
the flaws have been exposed. Too often this last minute
reconstruction is defended as being merely "illustrative,"
and I have never seen an instruction by a court limiting
this type of testimony.42
42 Worse still, there are recent cases which suggest that this kind of sandbag-
ging is entirely appropriate. In Martinez v. City of Poway, 12 Cal. Rptr. 2d 644
(1993), the Court held that it was not necessary for the defendant to advise the
plaintiff that post-deposition accident reconstruction had been performed. Id. at
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By the time the expert is called to deposition before
trial he should be fully prepared to testify concerning all
his opinions. Subsequent substantial changes in his opin-
ions should remain buried in the private reaches of his
mind.
I believe these are rules that trial lawyers need to adopt
and to insist on being respected. Having witnessed the
dreary and tedious manner in which large Bar Associa-
tions attempt to adopt rules, I do not believe that these
are issues for general bar associations. Is there any more
dispiriting experience than listening to a committee of
generalists trudge through issues they do not understand,
that do not effect them, and that are of no pressing con-
cern? The end result is usually so vague as to have no real
application for the day-to-day business of trial work. No,
these are issues that need to be defined by trial lawyers
and put into effect by trial lawyers. If nothing else, there
needs to be a code of ethics established for experts that
can at least guide a trial court in determining the intricate
complexities that sprout from the witness chair. One
thing seems clear, a general statement of ethical conduct
for expert witnesses seems long overdue.
432. The mere designation of the expert's name was considered to be sufficient
warning that this kind of deceit could be expected. Id.
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